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ABSTRACT: Even though Quentin Meillassoux’s philosophy is still in the making, to use Graham 
Harman’s (2015) expression, it has garnered sufficient attention to become the topic of an ever-
growing body of specialized literature. Here we wish to make a contribution in that direction. 
We offer an examination of Meillassoux’s definition of philosophy as “the invention of strange 
forms of argumentation”. We compare and contrast this definition to the one that has been 
offered by Deleuze & Guattari in What is Philosophy? 
Our examination of Meillassoux's core metaphilosophical ideas will follow the same 
methodological procedure that he himself outlined in his fictionalization of Deleuze as a pre-
Socratic. We contend that his novel interpretative technique, which relies heavily on 
fictionalization, should be repeatable by other authors. To this end, we evaluate his potential to 
become a philosophical heir to Alain Badiou. We explain why this may be the case, by positing 
a fictional situation that we will name “the Continental Expectation”, and then we will link that 
situation to the contents of Meillassoux’s philosophy, specifically to his concept of absolute 
contingency. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Before we examine Meillassoux’s definition of philosophy, let us pause for a 
moment to consider the way in which he presents correlationism, that is, the 
stylistic elements of that presentation, as if we were dealing with a narrative. The 
reasons for doing this will become clear later.  
Meillassoux’s presentation of correlationism gives the reader the impression 
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that correlationists are, as Hallward (2011: 137) says, “fossilized idealists”. A much 
less diplomatic but equally possible expression could be used. Nietzsche, in The 
Antichrist, said that Kant was “an idiot” (Nietzsche, 2007: 10). And this harsh 
expression seems to fit correlationists quite nicely, at least in the way Meillassoux 
presents them. Faced with the basic facts of contemporary science, such as the 
dates of the Big Bang and of the accretion of the Earth, Meillassoux presents the 
ideas of the correlationists in such a way that, to the reader, especially the 
scientifically-inclined reader, they end up looking like idiots. 
Or even something far worse, particularly for those readers familiar with 
Lenin’s writings. In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin (1972: 156-157) suggests 
that idealist philosophers are nothing more than bourgeois university professors 
who uphold ridiculous philosophies in order to keep their jobs. From this point 
of view, correlationists, as Meillassoux presents them, would be today’s version of 
idealist philosophers whose primary motivation is getting payed for teaching 
classes at universities. The content of their philosophies would be sheer nonsense. 
Instead of being individuals who are misinformed about the basic discoveries of 
contemporary science, correlationists would be ill-intentioned charlatans instead. 
This is why, among other reasons, Zizek has said in Less Than Nothing (2012: 625) 
that After Finitude “can effectively be read as Materialism and Empirio-Criticism 
rewritten for the twenty first-century”, a point that has also been acknowledged 
by Johnstone (2011: 95-96). Previously, Brassier (2007: 246-247) had noted the 
similarities and differences among both texts, which Brown (2011: 156) 
emphasizes and elaborates on. 
In sum, correlationists would fit at least three possible descriptions, each being 
worse than the preceding one: they are fossilized idealists, they are idiots, or they 
are charlatans. But are correlationists really this misguided, stupid or cynical? A 
cursory examination of the philosophers that Meillassoux calls “correlationists” 
indicates that the answer is “no”. One can disagree with thinkers such as Frege or 
Husserl, but to portray their philosophies as the simplistic lucubrations of 
stubborn, scientifically ignorant charlatans is inaccurate, to say the least. And we 
believe that Meillassoux is aware of this. So why does he choose portray them as 
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such?1 
2. MEILLASSOUX'S METAPHILOSOPHY 
The answer to the preceding question, we believe, is stylistic. More precisely, 
Meillassoux chooses to portray correlationists in the aforementioned way due to 
a stylistic strategy. It seems to us that his target audience, in the first chapter of 
After Finitude, is divided into two main groups. On the one hand, readers of 
Badiou. On the other hand, readers of analytic philosophy. In that chapter, he 
sets two goals. The first of them is to convince the readers of Badiou that it is time 
to move on; specifically, to move on from the enshrinement of mathematics to 
the enshrinement of the empirical sciences, such as astronomy, physics, 
chemistry, geology and biology. His second goal is to convince the readers of 
analytic philosophy that he, Quentin Meillassoux, is on their side. More 
specifically, he wants to convince them that he is attacking continental 
charlatanry with the same language in which that charlatanry is expressed; in 
other words, that he is “fighting fire with fire”, in the same way in which Socrates 
debated the Sophists “on their own terms”. Meillassoux would thus be a valuable 
comrade in the fight against postmodernism in the humanities, deploying a 
rhetorical strategy not entirely unlike that of Alan Sokal. 
It will be necessary to make some comments here. A reader of my manuscript 
pointed out that Meillassoux does not treat correlationists as if they were idiots, 
at all. I was then referred to Meillassoux's talk from the Speculative Realism 
workshop that took place at Goldsmiths in 2007. There, the reader says, 
Meillassoux make it clear that "the correlationist has a point", something that he 
had already acknowledged in After Finitude. The reader adds that Meillassoux's 
own position is closer to correlationism than to scientific realism, since he 
radicalizes the strong correlationist position in order to arrive at his own 
speculative materialist position. For these reasons, the reader concludes, there is 
 
1 Of course, Meillassoux does not explicitly mention either Frege or Husserl, but he implicitly refers to them 
when he asks “who has grasped the more originary correlation: is it the thinker of the subject-object 
correlation, the noetico-noematic correlation, or the language-referent correlation?” (Meillassoux, 2009: 6). 
The noetico-noematic correlation refers to phenomenology in general and to Husserl in particular, and the 
language-referent correlation refers to analytic philosophy in general and to Frege in particular. On the 
other hand, Meillassoux does explicitly mention both Wittgenstein and Heidegger. 
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no need to postulate that Meillassoux is employing a sophisticated rhetorical 
strategy; After Finitude cannot be read as a straightforward defense of scientific 
realism, such a reading is a misinterpretation, and therefore, my manuscript 
represents a regress in our interpretation of Meillassoux's philosophy. 
Allow me to disagree. Consider the following lines from After Finitude. Ensuing 
some lucubrations on the motives that scientists may have for siding with 
Cartesianism, together with their unwillingness to concede that primary qualities 
cannot exists as properties of things in themselves, Meillassoux concludes: 
 "And the truth is that their unwillingness to do so becomes all too understandable 
once one begins to seriously examine how the correlationist proposes to account 
for ancestrality." (Meillassoux, 2008: 13) 
If I was a correlationist, I would feel insulted by the preceding quote. That phrase 
would not be insulting if Meillassoux said "it becomes understandable" instead of 
saying "all too understandable". What is this, if not a jab at correlationism? One 
that is quite below the belt. The use of an idiom like "all too" is entirely rhetorical 
here. 
There is more, however. If the words cited before did not represent an insult, 
but only an injury, then the following ones quite certainly add insult to injury: 
"And our correlationist then finds herself dangerously close to contemporary 
creationists: those quaint believers who assert today, in accordance with a ‘literal’ 
reading of the Bible, that the earth is no more than 6,000 years old, and who, when 
confronted with the much older dates arrived at by science, reply unperturbed that 
God also created at the same time as the earth 6,000 years ago those radioactive 
compounds that seem to indicate that the earth is much older than it is – in order 
to test the physicists’ faith. Similarly, might not the meaning of the arche-fossil be 
to test the philosopher’s faith in correlation, even when confronted with data which 
seem to point to an abyssal divide between what exists and what appears?" 
(Meillassoux, 2008: 18) 
But perhaps we are not being charitable enough in our reading of 
Meillassoux. Perhaps the reader thinks that there is nothing wrong with being 
compared to someone who believes that the Earth is only 6,000 years old. So let 
us take a look at some of the things that Meillassoux had to say in 2007 at 
Goldsmiths: 
"Sometimes we encounter this enraging situation: a brilliant, subtle and interesting 
theory is easily refuted by a well-known and trivial argument, put forward by a 
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stupid opponent. That is often the situation of the post-Kantian realist faced with 
the correlationist." (Meillassoux, in Brassier et al., 2007: 421) 
The reader of my manuscript would do well to consider that in the preceding 
quote Meillassoux is explicitly characterizing the correlationist as "a stupid 
opponent". Thus, my question to them: how much more proof do you actually 
need? 
It is therefore no stretch of the imagination to suggest that Meillassoux has 
presented himself, in the first chapter of After Finitude, as a continental philosopher 
who is on the side of intellectually honest analytic philosophers, joining their 
crusade against the charlatanry of postmodern intellectuals, who are presumably 
reigning in today’s universities, at least in the humanities departments. 
But things take a dramatic, severe turn in the second chapter of After Finitude. 
Initially, nothing particularly alarming takes place; Meillassoux begins that 
chapter by rescuing the medieval term “absolute”, signaling to the reader that he 
is familiar with medieval philosophy in particular, and with the history of 
philosophy in general. 
Up to this point in After Finitude, not much is happening. It reads like a good-
old fashioned defense of empirical science against postmodern charlatans, in a 
style that is both novel and enjoyable. This tranquil picture is brutally altered 
when Meillassoux introduces the concept of hyper-Chaos. In his description of it, 
Meillassoux produces a complete rupture with everything that he has been saying 
thus far, including the style of the text. We are now in the presence of an author 
who presents himself to his target audience in way that the reader is beginning to 
question what exactly they are reading. Has Meillassoux lost his mind? Is he 
crazy?2 Is he a postmodern charlatan who has deceived and tricked the 
scientifically-minded readers into thinking that he was on “their side” when, in 
fact, he was “on the other side” all of this time?  
And what about the other subset of his target audience, the readers of Badiou? 
 
2 Meillassoux is aware that his philosophical reflections on hyper-Chaos may seem crazy. He acknowledges 
this point in his interview with Florian Hecker, titled Speculative Solution: Quentin Meillassoux and Florian Hecker 
talk Hyperchaos. There he discusses the concept of craziness; and in one of the definitions of rationality that 
he advances, he says: “I would say that rationality is really the possibility of being intelligently crazy.” 
(Meillassoux & Hecker, 2010: 5) 
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Have they been deceived? These readers, who are also familiar with the writings 
of Deleuze and Guattari, are not so easily shocked by crazy ideas, nor by 
convoluted texts. By the same token, they are harder to impress, especially when 
it comes to creative approaches to philosophy. In What is philosophy? Deleuze and 
Guattari say: 
“That is, philosophy is not a simple art of forming, inventing, or fabricating 
concepts, because concepts are not necessarily forms, discoveries, or products. 
More rigorously, philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts.” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 5) 
Thus, no matter how novel, far-fetched or even crazy a philosopher’s concepts 
can be, it is always possible to subsume them under a Deleuzian-Guattarian 
framework. Which means that, in order to move beyond that framework, in order 
to push the horizon further or to raise the philosophical bar to new heights, the 
sole creation of new concepts will not be enough, however novel or crazy they 
might be.  
If this is so, then the work of Badiou can only be acknowledged as an advance 
on condition that his philosophy has done something more than the creation of 
concepts. In Being and Event, as well as in other texts, Badiou must have done 
something different in order for his philosophy to be considered as an advance 
with respect to the Deleuzian-Guattarian framework. 
There are many reasons why this is actually the case, but at least one of them 
consists in the redefinition of philosophy that he offers in his Manifesto for 
Philosophy. In fact, he formulates several statements which begin with the phrase 
“Philosophy is…”, but all of these statements say more or less the same thing. For 
example, he says: 
“If philosophy is, as I defend it to be, the configuration, within thought, of the fact 
that its four generic conditions (the poem, the matheme, the political and love) are 
compossible in the eventful form prescribing the truths of  the time, a suspension of 
philosophy can result from the restriction or blockage of the free play required in 
order to define a regime of passage, or of intellectual circulation between the truth 
procedures conditioning philosophy.” (Badiou, 1999: 61) 
We may eliminate the conditional (“If…) together with the parenthesis that 
specify the generic conditions, and we may also eliminate what Badiou says about 
the blockage. By doing so, we see that for Badiou, philosophy is “the 
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configuration, within thought, of the fact that its four generic conditions are 
compossible in the eventful form prescribing the truths of the time”.  
Thus, there is a metaphilosophical difference between Deleuze & Guattari on 
the one hand, and Badiou on the other. Metaphilosophy can be defined as “the 
branch of philosophy that asks what philosophy is, how it should be done and 
why we should do it” (Overgaard, Gilbert, & Burwood, 2013: vii) or, more briefly, 
as philosophy of philosophy. By defining philosophy in a different way, Badiou 
effectively distances himself from the Deleuzian-Guattarian framework.  
What about Meillassoux? Does he have a metaphilosophy? To formulate the 
question in a more precise way, does Meillassoux offer a definition of philosophy? 
The answer is “yes”. It can be found in the third chapter of After Finitude, where 
he says: 
“Philosophy is the invention of strange forms of argumentation, necessarily 
bordering on sophistry, which remains its dark structural double. To philosophize 
is always to develop an idea whose elaboration and defence require a novel kind of 
argumentation, the model for which lies neither in positive science - not even in 
logic - nor in some supposedly innate faculty for proper reasoning. Thus it is 
essential that a philosophy produce internal mechanisms for regulating its own 
inferences - signposts and criticisms through which the newly constituted domain 
is equipped with a set of constraints that provide internal criteria for distinguishing 
between licit and illicit claims.” (Meillassoux, 2008: 76-77) 
Let us pause for a moment to consider Meillassoux’s definition of philosophy. 
We can restate the three definitions quoted before in the following way: 
1) Philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts (Deleuze & 
Guattari). 
2) Philosophy is the configuration, within thought, of the fact that its four 
generic conditions are compossible in the eventful form prescribing the truths of 
the time. (Badiou). 
3) Philosophy is the invention of strange forms of argumentation 
(Meillassoux). 
We will only compare the first definition with the third one.3 Both of them 
give importance to artistry, indicated by the terms “creating” and “invention”, 
 
3 Latter in this essay we will indicate why we have chosen not to compare Badiou’s definition of philosophy 
to the other ones.  
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respectively. But they differ as to what is created or invented by philosophy. For 
Deleuze & Guattari, concepts are what philosophy creates; while Meillassoux states 
that what philosophy invents are “strange forms of argumentation”, instead of 
concepts. Deleuze and Guattari say: 
“First, concepts are and remain signed: Aristotle's substance, Descartes's cogito, 
Leibniz's monad, Kant's condition, Schelling's power, Bergson's duration [durée]. 
But also, some concepts must be indicated by an extraordinary and sometimes even 
barbarous or shocking word, whereas others make do with an ordinary, everyday 
word that is filled with harmonics so distant that it risks being imperceptible to a 
nonphilosophical ear. Some concepts call for archaisms, and others for neologisms, 
shot through with almost crazy etymological exercises: etymology is like a 
specifically philosophical athleticism. In each case there must be a strange necessity 
for these words and for their choice, like an element of style.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1994: 7-8) 
Concepts, it may be said, are expressed by words or by series of words. A 
concept such as “rhizome” is a single word, while “body without organs” is a 
series of words. In any case, the point is that they are expressed by words, not by 
statements. Concepts are used in the formulation of statements. There are many 
kinds of statements, such as declarative, imperative, and interrogative, among 
others. When Deleuze & Guattari (2000: 33) say in Anti-Oedipus that “the body 
without organs is the ultimate residuum of a deterritorialized socius”, that is a 
declarative statement. When they say in A Thousand Plateaus (2005: 2) “Make 
rhizomes, not roots, never plant!”, that is an imperative statement. Recall that an 
argument is a series of declarative statements, in which some are called 
“premises”, and the last one is called “conclusion”. Thus, an example of an 
argument would be the following one: 
1. If the body without organs is an egg, then it is crisscrossed with axes and 
thresholds. 
2. The body without organs is an egg. 
3. Therefore, it is crisscrossed with axes and thresholds.4 
The preceding argument has a particular “form”, which means that it is a 
certain kind of argument. In this case, it is an argument called “modus ponens”. 
 
4 This example is based on Deleuze & Guattari (2000: 19), where they say: “The body without organs is an 
egg: it is crisscrossed with axes and thresholds, with latitudes and longitudes and geodesic lines” 
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For the purposes of evaluating the validity of an argument, it is not necessary to 
determine whether its  declarative statements are true or not. The only thing that 
matters is the form of the argument. In the preceding example, the argument is 
valid. Because if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true as well. 
That does not mean that the premises are actually true, it only means that if they 
were true, then the conclusion would also have to be true. 
When Deleuze & Guattari define philosophy as the discipline that involves 
creating concepts, they seem to be more interested in concepts rather than in 
statements or arguments. Concepts matter more than the statements, and the 
arguments, in which they are used. Meillassoux’s definition of philosophy 
emphasizes the strange forms of argumentation instead. In other words, for 
Meillassoux, the strange forms of argumentation matter more than the concepts 
and the statements that are used in them.  
To be sure, he does invent several arguments, in After Finitude as well as in 
other texts. For example, consider the following one: 
“1. Here is the first thesis: a contradictory entity is absolutely impossible, because if  an entity 
was contradictory, it would be necessary. But a necessary entity is absolutely impossible; 
consequently, so too is contradiction. Since there is every likelihood that the reader 
will dismiss such an argument as nonsensical, it is probably best that we begin by 
examining the principal reasons why he or she is liable to refuse such an inference.” 
(Meillassoux, 2008: 67) 
Meillassoux claims that this is an argument, and indeed it is. It can be 
reformulated in the following way, so as to better appreciate what kind of 
argument it is: 
1. If there is a contradictory entity, then there is a necessary entity. 
2. There is no necessary entity. 
3. Therefore, there is no contradictory entity. 
The form of the preceding argument is the following one: 
1. If P, then Q. 
2. Not Q. 
3. Therefore, not P. 
Meillassoux’s argument is valid, and it has a specific form: it is a modus tollens. 
What he has invented here is an argument, but he has not invented the form of 
that argument. On the contrary, the form that he uses is a well known one since 
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Antiquity. There are many more examples of this kind of invention in 
Meillassoux’s texts. In each case, he invents an argument, but not the form of the 
argument; instead he uses already familiar forms, such as modus tollens, modus 
ponens, and others. 
Inventing arguments certainly qualifies as an act of creativity, but 
Meillassoux’s definition of philosophy is not limited to this. However, in the 
original French version of Après la finitude, Meillassoux does not use the term 
“formes” (forms) in his definition of philosophy. Here is what the original French 
text says: 
“La philosophie est l'invention des argumentations étranges, à la limite, 
nécessairement, de la sophistique – qui demeure son souble obscur et structurel.” 
(Meillassoux, 2006: 103) 
The French equivalent to the English phrase “forms of argumentation” would 
be, literally, “formes d'argumentation". But this is not what the original text says. 
Instead, it says "argumentations étranges". In the Spanish translation, which was 
directly translated from the original French version by Margarita Martínez, the 
term "formas" (forms) is also missing. In that translation, we read: 
"La filosofía es la invención de argumentaciones extrañas, por necesidad en el 
límite de la sofística, que sigue siendo su doble oscuro y estructural." (Meillassoux, 
2015: 124) 
Yet, instead of considering the introduction of the term “forms” as an 
inaccuracy in the English translation, we will instead consider it as an advantage 
for our own line of reasoning, a happy accident which will enable us to distinguish 
clearly between an argument and the form of an argument; that is, the logical 
form of an argument. This being so, we said that Meillassoux invents new 
arguments, which qualify as strange, but that he does not invent new forms of 
arguments. Rather, he uses familiar forms such as modus tollens. We know what 
a strange argument is, but we do not know yet what a strange form of an 
argument is. So let us ask: what form of argument would qualify as strange? More 
precisely, what is a strange form of argument? 
If we are using a classical logic, such as propositional logic or predicate logic, 
no form of argument recognized as valid in these logics would qualify as 
“strange”. For example, the forms called “constructive dilemma” and “destructive 
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dilemma” may not be as famous or well-known as modus ponens and modus 
tollens, but there is nothing “strange” about them; they are valid forms of 
arguments. 
Thus, in order to obtain a “strange” form of argument, it would seem that it 
is necessary that the form in question be outside the scope of classical logics. One 
possible example of this, which Meillassoux does not mention, can be found in 
imperative logic. Because, unlike propositional logic and predicate logic, not all 
of the statements that are used in imperative logic are declarative. Some of them 
can be imperative statements. Thus, an “argument” in imperative logic could be 
the following one: 
1. Make rhizomes! 
2. A rhizome is an anti-genealogy. 
3. Therefore, make anti-genealogies!5 
In the preceding example, only the second statement is declarative. The first and 
third ones are imperative. The form of this “argument” is the following one: 
1. Do X! 
2. X is P. 
3. Therefore, do P! 
From the point of view of classical logics, the preceding form certainly qualifies 
as “strange”, because we are not really dealing with an argument here, since some 
of the statements are not declarative, but imperative instead. 
But this is still not exactly what Meillassoux is referring to in his definition of 
philosophy. Because, in the English translation, he speaks of strange forms of 
argumentation, not strange forms of arguments. Again, this is another advantage 
that the translation in question provides for our own line of reasoning. So we 
must consider the difference between arguments and argumentation. Why are 
they different? A possible answer to this can be found in Meillassoux’s comments 
on his definition of philosophy. He says that the model for inventing a novel kind 
of argumentation cannot be found “neither in positive science - not even in logic 
 
5 This example is based on Deleuze & Guattari (2005: 2) where they say: “Make rhizomes, not roots, never 
plant!”, and latter on (2005: 11), where they say: “We evolve and die more from our polymorphous and 
rhizomatic flus than from hereditary diseases, or diseases that have their own line of descent. The rhizome 
is an anti-genealogy.” 
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– nor in some supposedly innate faculty for proper reasoning”. Let us focus on 
the second of these, logic. And let us emphasize that for Meillassoux, the strange 
forms of argumentation that philosophy invents do not have logic as their model. 
Even more so, when he speaks of “logic” here, he is speaking in a broad sense. 
The model for inventing strange forms of argumentation cannot be found neither 
in classical logics, such as propositional logic and predicate logic, nor in “non-
classical” logics, such as imperative logic. Therefore, the example of an 
“imperative argument” that we offered before was only a preliminary step 
towards understanding what Meillassoux is talking about. Strictly speaking, our 
example is insufficient, insofar as the strange forms of argumentation that 
philosophy invents do not have logic, any logic whatsoever, as their model. 
This is because there is a difference between arguments and argumentation. 
An argument is a series of declarative statements in which some are premises and 
the last one is a conclusion. We can define argumentation, on the other hand, as 
the act of formulating arguments. In order to formulate a modus tollens, one 
begins by stating a conditional statement, such as “if P, then Q”. Then one negates 
Q. Finally, one obtains the negation of P. These are the rules for the formulation 
of a modus tollens. But there are no rules for the formulation of a series of 
arguments. Suppose that you are arguing something, or defending an idea. There 
is no rule that says that you have to begin with a modus ponens, followed by a 
modus tollens, then a constructive dilemma, and finally a destructive dilemma. 
Broadly speaking, you can defend your idea using whatever arguments you 
please, as long as you are using arguments and not fallacies.  
Although all of this may seem alien to Meillassoux’s philosophy, its pertinence 
can be clarified by examining his article on Deleuze titled Subtraction and 
Contraction. Since “to philosophize is to develop an idea whose elaboration and 
defence require a novel kind of argumentation”, we can ask the following 
questions: What is the idea that Meillassoux develops in Subtraction and Contraction? 
And, what is the novel kind of argumentation required by the elaboration and 
defence of that idea? 
The answer to the first question is this: the idea that Meillassoux defends in 
Substraction and Contraction is that Deleuze’s notion of immanence can be 
understood by reading Deleuze as if he was a pre-Socratic philosopher. He says: 
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“To understand this point of view, let us place ourselves in the following imaginary 
situation: let us decide to read Deleuze as a pre-Socratic, of whose writings we 
possess only a few rare fragments, including the text in question, which we will call 
the ‘Fragment of the Double Crown’ since in it two philosophers are said to be 
princes. To these fragments, we must add a ‘life’ of Deleuze by Diogenes Laertius, 
which teaches us little, apart from the fact that he was known as an original 
philosopher, rather than as a simple disciple of Spinoza or Bergson; and that his 
philosophy was known as a philosophy of immanence. This very term, in its 
banality, means nothing more precise to us than those terms such as ‘water’, ‘air’ or 
‘fire’ which designate the first principle of this or that pre-Socratic. The project of 
we ‘Deleuzian philologists’, then, is as follows: to extrapolate, on the basis of this 
fragment of the crown, the meaning that the pre-Socratic Deleuze attached to the 
notion – crucial for him, mysterious for us – of immanence.” (Meillassoux, 2007: 
65) 
As to the second question, the answer can be found in the rest of the text of 
Substraction and Contraction. Almost the entire text is dedicated to the novel kind of 
argumentation required for the elaboration and defense of the idea that Deleuze’s 
notion of immanence can be understood by reading him as if he was a pre-
Socratic philosopher. A summary of the main points of that novel kind of 
argumentation can be found in Harman’s (2015) book Quentin Meillassoux: 
Philosophy in the Making.  
In the case of Substraction and Contraction, Meillassoux invents both a new idea 
and a new way of defending that idea. But it is not necessary that new ideas be 
invented in order to do philosophy; rather, what is required is that the elaboration 
and defence of the idea be new, but not necessarily the idea itself. In other words, 
what are primarily required are not new concepts, but new ways of 
argumentation. Of course, this does not prohibit the creation of new concepts, 
but it does not emphasize that activity. Rather, it emphasizes the novel ways in 
which concepts, old or new, can be defended. 
Consider Meillassoux’s other book, The Number and the Siren. The idea that is 
developed and defended in this text is not new. It consists in declaring that there 
is a secret code in Mallarmés poem Coup de dés, which must be deciphered in 
order to understand the true meaning of the poem. As Meillassoux says, this idea 
was already stated years ago by scholars of Mallarmé such as Charles Chassé and 
Charles Mauron; and it has been discarded by contemporary scholars such as 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 284 
 
Jacques Rancière. “For connoisseurs of the oeuvre”, Meillassoux says, “have in 
general internalized the idea that only a naïve reader would still associate the 
Coupe de dés with the idea of a ‘secret code’” (Meillassoux, 2012: 4). 
So the idea that there is a secret code in Mallarmé’s poem is not new. But 
what is new in The Number and the Siren is the way in which this idea is developed, 
elaborated and defended. In other words, the argumentation that is used to 
elaborate and defend that idea is entirely novel. Again, a summary of 
Meillassoux’s novel kind of argumentation in the case of The Number and the Siren 
can be found in Harman’s (2015) book on Meillassoux.  
Let us get back to the difference between the metaphilosophy of Deleuze & 
Guattari and that of Meillassoux. In texts like After Finitude, Subtraction and 
Contraction, and The Number and the Siren, we find more things happening than the 
sole creation of concepts. Of course, Meillassoux does create concepts, and with 
great artistry. In the case of After Finitude: correlationism, the principle of 
unreason, hyper-Chaos, factiality, diachronic statements, among others. In the 
case of Subtraction and contraction: the concept of the pre-Socratic Deleuze, the 
Fragment of the Double Crown, the Major Crown School and Minor Crown 
School. But this is not all there is to it. In fact, it is not even the main point of his 
philosophy. Rather, it is the novel kind of argumentation that he invents in each 
of these texts what distinguish his philosophy from the Deleuzian-Guattarian art 
of creating concepts. 
We should also pause for a moment on the distinction that Meillassoux traces 
between philosophy and sophistry. We must remember that Meillassoux says that 
philosophy is “necessarily bordering on sophistry, which remains its dark 
structural double”. And of course, he notes, time and time again, that his claims 
might appear strange or incredible to the reader. Even more so, he is concerned 
with maintaining credibility in the eyes of his readers, at least a minimum degree 
of it. Thus, regarding an objection against his line of reasoning in After Finitude, 
he says that it is “an objection which we shall have to expound and refute if we 
want our speculative approach to retain a minimal degree of credibility.” 
(Meillassoux, 2008: 83). Such concern for credibility would not arise if 
Meillassoux was as reckless as Golumbia (2016) portrays him. True, his writing 
does not follow the standard academic procedures for producing monographs. 
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But that does not mean that he is not doing philosophy. Although it would be a 
cliché to remind the reader that some of the best philosophical work has been 
done outside the norms of Academia, it is a worthwhile reminder nonetheless. 
Yet this raises the following question: if philosophy can be done in such a way, 
how do we distinguish philosophy from charlatanry? 
Since sophistry, by Meillassoux’s own admission, is not only the dark 
structural double of philosophy, but also that towards which philosophy tends, 
because it is “necessarily bordering” on it, the preceding question becomes even 
more difficult to answer. The solution, we believe, can be found by tracing an 
analogy between Meillassoux’s definition of philosophy and his comments on 
Deleuze in Subtraction and Contraction. There he says: 
“In this model, there could be nothing worse than to achieve that towards which we tend. One 
tends towards chaos when one invents, when one creates, but there is nothing one 
intends less than actually catching up with it. It is at once a tendential and an anti-
regulative model: we must continually approach the chaos which governs the 
propensity to create, and continually guard against falling into it.” (Meillassoux, 
2007: 106) 
According to the model elaborated for the pre-Socratic Deleuze in Subtraction 
and Contraction, there could be nothing worse than actually catching up with chaos, 
even if one tends towards it when one creates. By comparison, we may say the 
following regarding Meillassoux’s definition of philosophy: there could be nothing 
worse than to catch up with sophistry, even if philosophy tends towards it when 
it invents. 
And how does one avoid falling into sophistry when doing philosophy, 
according to Meillassoux? By the production of “internal mechanisms for 
regulating its own inferences”, meaning that there be “a set of constraints that 
provide internal criteria for distinguishing between licit and illicit claims”. It seems 
to us that this is precisely what sophistry and charlatanry lack. Sophists are able 
to teach anything to anyone, they are able to defend a thesis as well as the 
negation of that thesis. Charlatans, as the name implies, are able to talk about 
anything, even about issues on which they are not experts, they are able to talk 
in a reckless manner about anything they please. But not philosophers. It is not 
so much that these trace a difference between what can be said and what cannot 
be said. It would be more proper to say that the difference that philosophers trace 
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is between licit and illicit claims. Anything may be said, but once it is said, it is 
not necessarily a legitimate claim. This runs contrary to Wittgenstein’s famous 
final proposition of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which says “7. What we 
cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” (Wittgenstein, 2002: 89). 
3. HEIR TO BADIOU 
Here we will offer an application of Meillassoux's metaphilosophy. We will try to 
defend a particular idea, by using a form of argumentation which we will try to 
make as strange as we possibly can. Of course, if we are to follow Meillassoux to 
the letter, then this means that our example will necessarily border on sophistry, 
since philosophy tends towards it when it invents. But we will also try to not fall 
into it, just like one must try to not actually catch up with chaos when one creates 
concepts in the manner of a pre-Socratic Deleuze. 
The idea that we will defend is that Meillassoux is a potential heir to Badiou. 
Recall that we did not delve into the relation between Badiou's metaphilosophy 
and Meillassoux's. We said that we would not compare the definitions of 
philosophy that these two thinkers offer. The reason for this is that it would be 
too early to inquire on this issue. Not only is Meillassoux’s philosophy still in the 
making, but the relation between his philosophy and Badiou’s is still in the 
making as well. As Harman (2015: 111) says, Meillassoux could well be a potential 
philosophical heir to Badiou. To be sure, he has already written several texts on 
Badiou, such as Decision and undecidebility in Being and Event I; Badiou and Mallarmé: 
The Event and the Perhaps; and History and Event in Alain Badiou. But it seems that the 
relation of his philosophy to that of his mentor is still under development.  
However, instead of seeing this as an obstacle, we will once again deploy our 
strategy of transforming it into an advantage for our own line of reasoning. More 
precisely, we will fictionalize this situation in approximately the same way as 
Meillassoux fictionalized Deleuze. This being so, instead of a "pre-Socratic 
Deleuze", we will speak of a "post-Kantian Meillassoux". Not in the sense of neo-
Kantians such as Cohen, Natorp, and Rickert, but more in the sense of idealists 
such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. And in a more specific sense, we may think 
of Badiou as a kind of contemporary version of Kant. Just as Hume's essays 
awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber, Badiou claims that Cantor's set 
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theory awoke him from his Sartrean slumber. Meillassoux would thus also be a 
post-Kantian in the sense that he is a post-Badiouian.  
In his article History and Event in Alain Badiou, Meillassoux (2011) says that he 
does not speak as a disciple of Badiou, precisely because he is developing his own 
philosophical positions, different from the ones of his former teacher. We can 
resort to an analogy to emphasize the difference between a disciple and a 
philosophical heir. Both Speusippus and Aristotle, among others, were Plato's 
disciples. Speusippus was Plato's nephew, and he replaced him as the new 
director of the Academy after Plato’s death. Yet, the history of philosophy 
recognizes Aristotle, and not Speusippus, as Plato's greatest disciple and also as 
his most important philosophical heir. 
Why? Although there are many reasons at work here, including sociological 
and political ones, it seems to us that one of those reasons is that Speusippus 
produced a philosophy that was closer to Plato’s, while Aristotle elaborated an 
entirely new philosophy, which departed even further from his teacher’s. Of 
course, there are several Platonic elements in Aristotle's philosophy, especially in 
the works of his youth. Nonetheless, Aristotle developed a critique of Plato's 
philosophy which permitted him, in his mature works, to inaugurate a new 
philosophical system which, despite being indebted to Plato, was sufficiently 
different from his teacher's so as to qualify as something new and original. 
Speusippus also criticized Plato’s philosophy on several accounts, but his break 
with his teacher was not as decisive and pronounced as Aristotle’s. 
So, if Meillassoux is really a potential philosophical heir to Badiou, then he 
has to do something radically different from his teacher in order to earn that title. 
At this point, in order to proceed, we may formulate two assumptions, which may 
initially strike the reader as strange: 
1) It is the case that there can be a philosophical heir to Badiou. 
2) The contents of the philosophy of Badiou's heir is less important than the 
fact that its author is recognized as a heir to Badiou. 
Let us explain what we mean. The first proposition simply says that, at some 
moment in time, a certain author can be widely recognized as Badiou's heir, in 
the same way that Plato is recognized as the heir to Socrates, Aristotle as the heir 
to Plato, Marx as the heir to Hegel, Nietzsche as the heir to Schopenhauer, 
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Heidegger as the heir to Husserl, Russell as the heir to Frege, and so on. Thus, 
there is nothing particularly paradoxical about the first statement. It is the second 
statement that presents some initial perplexity. 
What does the second statement mean, exactly? It means that, at least in the 
community of continental philosophers, there is a kind of expectation that has 
been building up during the past few decades. We are of course formulating this 
as a conjecture, not as something that has been definitely proven. It seems to us 
that authors like Alain Badiou, Slavoj Zizek, Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe, Toni Negri, among others, are some of the most widely read 
philosophers in the continental community today. This group of authors have, to 
a certain extent, posited their works as successors to thinkers such as Foucault, 
Deleuze, Barthes, Althusser and Lyotard, among others, which would belong to 
a previous generation. We are not saying that the works of Foucault and Deleuze 
are no longer read today; on the contrary, their works are probably more read 
than those of Badiou and Zizek. However, just as Badiou has posited his own 
work as subsequent to that of Deleuze, it seems to us that today there is a certain 
expectation to know who is going to be the greatest disciple of Badiou, his most 
noteworthy successor. 
What the second statement implies is that the expectation we are referring to 
has become so acute that it simply does not matter who is Badiou's successor, or 
what the contents of their philosophy are. What matters is that his successor is 
announced as such, and afterwards, that his successor is recognized as such by the 
majority of the community of continental philosophy. It is only after Badiou's 
successor is recognized as such, that the contents of their philosophy are studied, 
analyzed and criticized. We will call this situation “the Continental Expectation”.  
In this sense, Meillassoux has been announced as Badiou's potential heir, and 
he is starting to be recognized as a potential heir to him by a considerable part 
of the community in question. Thus, a newcomer to this state of affairs will begin 
by first recognizing Meillassoux as a potential heir to Badiou, and only afterwards 
(perhaps immediately afterwards, but afterwards after all) they will start to 
become acquainted with the contents of Meillassoux's philosophy. 
How so? In what way could the preceding occur? In the first place, the 
newcomer to this state of affairs probably heard their colleagues talk about an 
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emerging philosopher called Quentin Meillassoux, and that his first book, After 
Finitude, has a Foreword written by Alain Badiou, and so on.  
We are aware that the reader can meet our preceding remarks with 
skepticism. And they would be right to be skeptical about this. Because, if the 
only conditions that Meillassoux has to meet for being a potential heir to Badiou 
are as banal and superficial as the ones that we have pointed out, then there is 
not really much at stake. Anyone could have done as much. So what we will 
provide here is a more profound reason for why Meillassoux is a potential heir to 
Badiou. A reason which is to be found in the contents of Meillassoux’s philosophy. 
More specifically, we state that there is a fundamental relation between the 
Continental Expectation and the contents of Meillassoux’s philosophy. 
What is this relation? On the one hand, the Continental Expectation is the 
situation in which the community of continental philosophers is expecting 
Badiou’s successor to appear, no matter who they are, and no matter what they 
have to say. On the other hand, the core concept of Meillassoux’s philosophy is 
absolute contingency, which can be poetically called “hyper-Chaos”. This 
absolute contingency is what makes syntactic systems possible, and among these, 
different formal languages. Just as one cannot say that the infinite variants of chess 
are “less legitimate” than classical chess, one cannot say that a certain person is 
a “less legitimate” candidate to fulfill the Continental Expectation. Because this 
expectation explicitly says that such a role can be fulfilled by anyone, the only 
condition being that the person in question has to be recognized as Badiou’s 
philosophical heir. Nevermind what they actually write or say; once it is conceded 
that the person is indeed Badiou’s heir, then only afterwards one begins to pay 
attention to what they write and say. But if this is the case, then the relation 
between the Continental Expectation and Meillassoux’s concept of absolute 
contingency starts to become clear. The Continental Expectation is contingent. 
More precisely, it has, as a property, radical contingency. 
Meillassoux is the only philosopher whose work has a concept that can 
capture what is absolute about the Continental Expectation, namely contingency. 
Thus, the relation between the contents of his philosophy and that situation is not 
accidental, it is fundamental. In principle, anyone can be Badiou’s heir, but there 
is only one philosopher, Quentin Meillassoux, whose work has been able to 
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thematize this situation as such, and in an extreme way, we might add. Who else 
among the potential candidates to succeed Badiou have a philosophical concept 
that enables them to claim, in an absolute sense, that anyone can be a successor 
to Badiou? We are not aware of any such candidates. But what is most important, 
even if there actually were such candidates, they would not have been the first 
ones to propose a concept like absolute contingency. In this specific sense, what 
Meillassoux has done is akin to what Mallarmé has done in Un Coup de dés. The 
Mallarmean act of writing such a poem can only be done once: “Everything is 
necessarily contingent, except contingency itself and the unique act of the Poet 
who incorporates himself into it - once, once only, and forever. Never again. 
Nevermore.” (Meillassoux, 2012: 166). An attempt to do the same thing that 
Mallarmé did would not be as groundbreaking as the Coup de dés itself, it would 
be repetition of it, no matter how many variations are introduced. Likewise, an 
attempt to do the same thing that Meillassoux has done, no matter how many 
variations are introduced, will not be as groundbreaking as what he has published 
so far. It will only be a repetition of it. Mallarmé was the first, the only, and the 
last, to accomplish the sophisticated goal of the Coup de dés. It is, in a sense, a work 
which closes upon itself. Meillassoux was the first, the only, and the last to forge 
a philosophical concept that can capture what is absolute in the Continental 
Expectation: that it is contingent, that Badiou’s successor can be, literally, anyone. 
Anyone else who claims the same thing is only repeating what can already be 
found in Meillassoux’s work, although in an implicit, rather than in an explicit 
way. 
Yet, why should a philosopher who is able to thematize this have “more right” 
to claim the title of Badiou’s heir, instead of anyone else? Compare this situation 
with this other one: suppose that John says “I have invented a game of chess were 
the rooks move diagonally”. Peter says “In my variant of chess, queens can only 
move horizontally”. Sarah says “According to my system, pawns can move in all 
directions”. Each of them insists that their own variant of chess is superior to those 
of their peers. Then Jane says “It does not matter what variant of chess you invent, 
all of them are equally legitimate”. Jane would be comparable to Meillassoux. 
Whoever claims to be Badiou’s heir, implicitly or explicitly, cannot secure the 
claim that their own work, their own philosophy, is superior to that of their peers. 
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On the contrary, whoever claims, implicitly or explicitly, that Badiou’s heir can 
be literally anyone, and that all of the candidates are equally legitimate, is the 
only one that has discovered what is absolute about the Continental Expectation. 
And it is important that whoever claims this, implicitly or explicitly, be the first 
to do so. We believe that Meillassoux has been the first to implicitly suggest this, 
because it can be deduced as a consequence from the contents of his philosophy, 
even if he is unaware of it. 
Stated differently, if you are the first to suggest, even implicitly, that Badiou’s 
heir can be literally anyone, then you are Badiou’s philosophical heir par excellence, 
because in order to be Badiou’s heir, you have to fulfill the Continental 
Expectation. If you do this in such a way that your own philosophy is able to 
capture what is essential about that expectation, then your title is secured. 
Anyone else who tries to use the same procedure will only be repeating what you 
have already said. 
Yet, an objection can be formulated at this point: this whole narrative of 
philosophical heirs has been called into question time and time again. For 
example, Seneca wrote: 
“Will I not walk in the footsteps of my predecessors? I will indeed use the ancient 
road—but if I find another route that is more direct and has fewer ups and downs, 
I will stake out that one. Those who advanced these doctrines before us are not our 
masters but our guides. The truth lies open to all; it has not yet been taken over. 
Much is left also for those yet to come.” (Seneca, 2015: 112) 
Which means that, if a different way of doing philosophy is possible, one that has 
not been previously advanced by our predecessors, then one can choose that as 
a starting point, instead of having to develop one’s philosophy in relation to what 
one’s predecessors have done. Centuries later, Russell said: 
“I do not propose to meet the views that I disagree with by controversy, by arguing 
against those views, but rather by positively setting forth what I believe to be the 
truth about the matter, and endeavouring all the way through to make the views 
that I advocate result inevitably from absolutely undeniable data. When I talk of 
“undeniable data” that is not to be regarded as synonymous with “true data”, 
because “undeniable” is a psychological term and “true” is not.” (Russell, 2009: 2-
3) 
Instead of developing one’s philosophy by first entering into a discussion with 
one’s predecessors and contemporaries, one can instead choose to begin with 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 292 
 
whatever topic one wishes; in Russell’s case, by what he calls “undeniable data”. 
So arguing with others is not necessarily a precondition for developing a new 
philosophy. 
More recently, Michel Onfray has suggested that we should distrust the idea 
that the greatest disciple that Socrates had was Plato. Socrates had other disciples, 
pejoratively termed “minor Socratics”, such as the Cynics, the early Greek Stoics, 
and the Cyrenaics. None of these, according to Onfray, should be considered 
“minor” Socratics. Instead, they should be viewed as thinkers that were just as 
profound as Plato, if not even more so.  
All of this means that neither Meillassoux nor anyone else should be 
considered as a heir to Badiou, since the very idea of philosophical heirs is being 
called into question. Yes, the history of philosophy has labeled Plato as the 
greatest disciple of Socrates, otherwise the term “minor Socratics” would have 
never been used. But this should not confuse us to the point were we continue to 
legitimate the idea of philosophical heirs. Whence, Onfray’s Counter-History of  
Philosophy.  
There is a way to dissipate this objection, a way that makes use of the contents 
of Meillassoux’s philosophy. Recall that hyper-Chaos can destroy anything. If this 
is so, then it can destroy the idea of philosophical heirs. It seems to us that this is 
even more extreme than what Onfray suggests. Because here we are not talking 
about exposing the fraudulent aspects of the official history of philosophy. Here 
we are talking about a lawless power which is capable of effectively destroying the 
official history of philosophy, and in the most radical way imaginable: of turning 
it into nothing, from one moment to the next, without reason. 
Of course, this line of defense has its limitations. Hyper-Chaos cannot destroy 
the history of philosophy, or any other thing, if does not actually exist. Personally, 
we do not think that it does. But, personal opinions aside, we may carry on by 
saying that calling into question the idea of philosophical heirs is speculatively 
recuperable within the framework of Meillassoux’s philosophy. The conclusion to 
be drawn is this: Meillassoux’s philosophy has the conceptual resources for it to 
be considered the successor to Badiou’s, and at the same time it has the 
conceptual resources for annihilating the very idea of philosophical heirs in 
general. Let us remember that hyper-Chaos is not pure disorder, since it can 
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produce both order and disorder. Meillassoux’s philosophy, by comparison, is 
able to posit itself as the successor of Badiou’s and also to annihilate this very 
succession. Why? Because of the Perhaps which Meillassoux inherited from 
Mallarmé. Perhaps Meillassoux is Badiou’s heir, perhaps not. Maybe he is the 
one that will succeed him, maybe not. If it were asked, “Is Meillassoux the heir 
to Badiou?”, then the answer, in the strictest sense, is “Maybe”. Or, to phrase it 
more technically, though less clear: it is not the case that Meillassoux is a potential 
heir to Badiou; rather, it is the case that he may be a potential heir to Badiou, in 
the Mallarmean sense of the Perhaps as that which replaces Being.  
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Let us return to an issue that we discussed at the beginning of this essay. Why did 
Meillassoux produce such a brutal rupture in the second chapter of After Finitude, 
when he introduced the concept of hyper-Chaos? After all, he was apparently 
launching an attack against dubious idealistic philosophers in the name of 
mathematics and empirical science, formulating his attack in the language of 
those philosophers themselves, like a saboteur sneaking into an enemy facility 
and planting a bomb. But that whole storyline was brutally disfigured when he 
introduced the concept of hyper-Chaos. What were Meillassoux’s reasons for 
doing so? 
There are a number of possibilities which cannot be initially ruled out. One 
of them is that it was due to a stylistic reason: Meillassoux composed After Finitude 
in such a way that it would be an enjoyable text to read, regardless of its content. 
In this sense, the storyline developed in the first chapter is like a battleship sailing 
towards the enemy’s port, only to suffer an unexpected shipwreck when it crashed 
into an unforeseen glacial mass, an iceberg that we may call “hyper-Chaos”. On 
the part of the reader, the interest in reading the rest of After Finitude would reside 
in finding out why that shipwreck occurred, desperately seeking an explanation 
for an unforeseen event, like the characters in a science fiction novel who seek an 
answer to something that initially seemed to be impossible. 
There are other possibilities. Perhaps Meillassoux is crazy. Perhaps he is a 
charlatan. Perhaps he has discovered an important consequence for theoretical 
physics in particular, and for science in general. Perhaps he wanted to invent a 
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new literary genre. Perhaps he is doing philosophy in an entirely new way. 
Although arguments could be offered for and against each of these possibilities, 
none of them can be entirely be ruled out in principle. 
But perhaps there was no reason. Perhaps Meillassoux had no reason 
whatsoever for brutally altering the storyline of After Finitude with the introduction 
of hyper-Chaos in the second chapter. Perhaps this cannot be explained in any 
way, be it in terms of literature, science, philosophy or sophistry, simply because 
there was no motivation or reason behind it. A literary critic would attempt to 
find an artistic explanation, claiming that Meillassoux’s motivations are aesthetic. 
A psychologist would claim that Meillassoux is crazy, since he is upholding 
something so extravagant that he must certainly be psychotic. An opposer of 
sophistry would claim that Meillassoux introduced the concept of hyper-Chaos 
simply because he is a charlatan who wants fame and money. Finally, it could be 
claimed that Meillassoux is simply developing his own philosophy, departing from 
his predecessors, Badiou and Deleuze, so as to offer something new and unique. 
What all of these claims have in common is that they assume that there was 
indeed a reason for introducing the concept of hyper-Chaos, just like there must 
be a reason for why a shipwreck occurred, just like there must be reason for why 
a pair of dice always turn up a double six every time they are thrown. And if 
there is one lesson to be learned from Meillassoux’s philosophy, the core lesson, 
if you will, is that perhaps there is no such reason. This possibility, that there was 
no reason whatsoever, cannot be ruled out either. Yes, maybe he is crazy. Yes, 
maybe he is a charlatan. Yes, maybe he is creating a new literary genre. Yes, 
maybe he wants to develop a novel philosophy. Or maybe not. Maybe he is not 
crazy, maybe he is not a charlatan, maybe he is not creating a new literary genre, 
maybe he does not want to develop a novel philosophy. Or, to state it more 
bluntly: even if Meillassoux was some of these things, and even if he was all of 
these things, that does not necessarily mean that there was a reason for 
introducing the concept of hyper-Chaos in the second chapter of After Finitude. 
Neither artists, scientists, charlatans or philosophers do art, science, charlatanry 
or philosophy twenty-four hours a day, every day. Sometimes they do other 
things. Sometimes artists do things for non-artistic reasons, sometimes scientists 
do things for non-scientific reasons. Sometimes they do things for no reason 
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whatsoever.  
It would be futile to claim, with a tone of absolute certainty, that the reason 
in question was unconscious. Appeals to Meillassoux’s unconscious are 
questionable precisely because what is being called into question is the notion of 
a motivation itself, be it conscious or unconscious. It is possible that there was no 
reason whatsoever behind his acts, at least this particular act. 
Can we claim, with absolute certainty, that as a matter of fact, Meillassoux 
did not have any reason whatsoever for introducing the concept of hyper-Chaos 
in the second chapter of After Finitude? No, because we cannot rule out all of the 
other possibilities, artistic, scientific, pathological, deceptive, philosophical. But 
we cannot rule out the possibility of an absence of reason either. Unlike the 
endings of science fiction texts, such as Asimov’s story of the billiard ball, here it 
is not simply the case that there was a reason and that we have no way of finding 
it out for sure. Here it is a case of considering that maybe there was no reason at 
all. Instead of saying that there must be a reason that we do not know, we could 
say instead that maybe there was no reason and we know this; we know that maybe 
there was no reason whatsoever. 
According to Meillassoux, we would do better in recognizing that finitude is 
not simply the mark of our ignorance, but a real property of things in themselves. 
In a similar fashion, we can say that we would do better in recognizing that perhaps 
it is not the case that we are ignorant of Meillassoux’s reasons for doing this or 
that, but rather that there are no such reasons, at all. If, through a sacrifice, 
Mallarmé himself became Chance (Meillassoux, 2012: 127-128), we may say that 
Meillassoux himself, through a different sacrifice, became absolute contingency. 
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